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Abstract
A common cloud forensic model proposed by researchers is ‘Cloud-Forensic-as-a-Service’ where consumers have to
access it as a service to collect forensic data from cloud environments. The ‘Cloud-Forensic-as-a-Service’ model raises the
question of how it collects digital evidence pertaining to an incident which occurred in the cloud. Currently, types of
‘Cloud-Forensic-as-a-Service’ systems in the literature show that the system is controlled and implemented by the cloud
provider, where they unilaterally define the type of evidence that can be collected by the system. A serious limitation of
this approach is that it does not offer the consumer sufficient means of performing reasonableness checks to verify that
the provider is not accidentally or maliciously contaminating the evidence. To address the problem, the paper proposes a
conceptual bilateral Cloud-Forensic-as-a-Service model where both consumers and providers can independently collect,
verify the equity of the forensic analysis process and try to resolve potential disputes emerging from the independently
collected results. The authors have developed a cloud forensic process model to lead common and significant aspects of
a bilateral Cloud-Forensics-as-a-Service model. The paper explicitly discusses the concept of a bilateral Cloud-Forensic-as-
a-Service model.
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Introduction
The focus of this research is on cloud forensic services
provided remotely to Cloud Service Consumers (CSCs)
over the internet. According to the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), cloud services can
either be offered as an Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS),
Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) or Software-as-a-Service
(SaaS) model [1]. Leaving aside specific technical details,
the authors consider there to be Cloud Service Providers
(CSPs) that sell the three basic IaaS services including stor-
age, compute power and network to remote CSCs [2]. The
authors are interested in providing a Cloud-Forensics-as-a-
Service (CFaaS) model that is integrated into cloud archi-
tectures for the purpose of forensic investigations involving
cloud environments. Consequently, an implemented CFaaS
interface is made available to the CSCs, via the Service
Level Agreements (SLAs) signed with their CSPs, to assist
them in their investigation of their adopted cloud services.
Central to this CFaaS model is the issue of accountability
for the digital evidence: who performs the investigation and
decides what kind of digital evidence is required for a spe-
cific cloud forensics case –– the provider, the consumer, a
trusted third party, or some combination of them? Trad-
itional digital forensics investigations (non-cloud), investiga-
tors had the ability to seize any suspected device. However,
in contrast to traditional digital investigations, the infra-
structure responsible for the CFaaS model is deployed at
the premises of the CSPs. In other words, the CSPs have a
higher degree of control over most of the critical evidence
needed for investigations involving cloud environments.
In this light, CSCs and Law Enforcement Agents
(LEAs) are heavily dependent on the CSPs to obtain the
evidence required for a cloud forensics case, as they have
limited control on the cloud systems and data residing
in it. This dependency further leads to serious issues
surrounding trust in the CSPs, like originality of the
evidence and timely response to litigation holds [3–6].
The distinguishing feature of the CSP side evidence
collection is that it seems to be unilateral. CSP side foren-
sics evidence collection can be acceptable when the CSC
has good reasons to trust the CSP of not accidentally or
maliciously contaminating the critical forensic evidence.
However, the authors contend that there may be cases
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where this assumption does not hold, or there is a dispute
between the CSCs and CSPs, and where other models are
needed. Consequently, unilateral CSCs side evidence
collection can be implemented, but, a trusted third party
acting on behalf of both CSCs and CSPs would be more
practical [7]. However, in this paper the authors consider a
hitherto unexplored alternative of bilateral forensics in the
collection and analysis of cloud based evidence. A new
model, where the CSCs and CSPs independently collect
and analyze digital evidence, compare their outputs and
agree on a mutually trusted output, is proposed. The
problem of achieving mutual trust in cloud forensics in-
vestigations is not currently covered in the literature but is
becoming important as CSCs organizations increas-
ingly rely on cloud computing for their needs. In this
regard, technical issues in bilateral cloud forensics is
explored and a model that is abstract and general
enough to be applied to the different types of IaaS re-
sources is developed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next
section discusses an overview of cloud forensics. Section
3 highlights existing digital and cloud forensic process
models reviewed in this study. In section 4 the live cloud
forensic process model intended to guide the develop-
ment of the bilaterally trusted CFaaS model is discussed.
Section 5 describes the state of the art of the related
work. In section 6 the CFaaS model is presented, and
finally in section 7 a case study scenario is formulated to
discuss the feasibility of the model.
Cloud forensics
Cloud Forensics (CF) covers more than one area of know-
ledge, and can be referred to as the application of digital
forensics in cloud computing environments [8]. Another
definition introduced by the newly established NIST Cloud
Forensic Working Group, states that “Cloud Computing
Forensic science is the application of scientific principles,
technology practices and derived and proven methods to
process past cloud computing events through identification,
collection, preservation, examination and reporting of
digital data for the purpose of facilitating the reconstruc-
tion of these events” [1]. Consequently, cloud forensics is
more complicated due to the default nature of its char-
acteristics such as multi-tenancy, multi-jurisdiction,
data duplication and high degree of virtualization. Simi-
larly, the chain of dependency or the trade of services
among CSPs have made it difficult to follow the con-
tinuity of digital evidence in cloud. Therefore, in the
case of cloud, the traditional forensic process models
that were applicable in non-cloud environments are no
longer practical. As a result, those traditional methods
can be modified so as to adapt to the cloud environments
or else cloud specific steps may precede existing methods
in order to utilize such methods in cloud
environments [9–11]. In general, the digital forensic
investigation process is a post incident activity as it is
mostly initiated after an incident happens. It follows
few pre-defined steps, and in a cloud environment,
can be implemented in two areas, that is, CSCs side
forensics and CSPs side forensics.
CSCs side forensic
Forensic data pertaining to security incidents happening in
cloud environments are left behind both on the CSCs and
CSPs sides. Investigating cloud security incidents generally
starts at the CSCs side. Identifying sources of forensic data
and collecting them on the CSCs side is therefore deemed
as a vital part of the cloud investigation process [12]. In
order for the forensic data to be used as evidence, in cloud
forensics, data have to be collected as early as possible in
their sterile state. That is, forensic data residing in the cloud
can purposefully or inadvertently be erased by the stake-
holders. Similarly, it can also be erased by the cloud re-
sources due to system configuration. For instance, the web
browser history and session logs can be configured to be
overwritten or erased after a specific period or when the file
size reaches the configured maximum limit.
In the meantime, the rapid increase of the consumer’s side
endpoints, especially devices for Bring Your Own Device
(BYOD) scenarios makes identification and collection of
forensic data even more challenging [13]. Hence, to recon-
struct a timeline of events for a cloud security incident,
identifying and collecting those BYOD endpoints in a timely
manner and keeping evidence integrity intact is crucial.
CSPs side forensic
It is essential that forensic data are similarly collected
from the CSPs side. There are many forensic data cre-
ated and made available on the cloud resources, which
form a critical part of the forensic data. The lack of in-
vestigators’ accessibility to the physical infrastructure of
the cloud and the unknown location of the cloud data
centers make it much harder, if not impossible, to iden-
tify, isolate and collect forensic data in the cloud. Fur-
thermore, in a highly decentralized and virtualized cloud
environment, it is quite common that the forensic data
may be scattered across multiple data centers situated in
different geographic locations [3, 14]. Even if the loca-
tion is known, seizing systems at the data centers may
endanger the availability of the cloud, and may as a re-
sult affect other co-tenants. This issue has been widely
raised in the literature and some researchers have sug-
gested possible solutions [2–4, 10, 14, 15].
The loss of data ownership for CSCs organizations to
CSPs is another major issue in CF. As a result, CSCs are
entrusting the data stewardship to the CSPs. According to
the European Network and Information Security Agency
(ENISA)‘s, ‘loss of data stewardship to the CSPs’ is one of
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the top risks of cloud computing. This loss of stewardship
thus poses another big bottleneck for collecting forensic
data from the cloud. Nevertheless, this loss of control de-
pends on the type cloud deployment and service model, as
outlined in Table 1. For example, in IaaS, CSCs have more
control and relatively unfettered access to the system logs
and data. Conversely, in PaaS and SaaS, CSCs have either
limited or no access to such data. Hence, as the CSCs lose
control of their data, at the same time, they are losing the
identification and collection of forensic data for any subse-
quent forensic needs [10, 14]. In other words, as the degree
of control of the CSCs decreases, less forensic data is avail-
able for CSCs. Subsequently, this creates more dependency
on the CSPs to get access to such forensic data. This is
illustrated in Table 2.
Digital and cloud forensic process models
Not only the digital evidence is needed to succeed in any
court of law, the process followed in conducting the investi-
gation will also be needed to prevail in courts. In response,
researchers and forensic practitioners have proposed several
digital forensic process models. Different researchers have
refined previously published process models and proposed
new ones, resulting in a variety of digital forensic process
models and terminologies. A number of digital forensic
process models selected for the design of a new process
model, intended to guide in the development of the CFaaS
model, are presented in this section. In this paper, in order
to capture and visualize the flow of the processes in the
existing digital forensic process models, the ordering of the
processes have been represented by a Sequential Logic as
adopted from [16, 17].
On this sequential logic representation of the digital
forensic process models, the outcome of the circuit is
dependent on the input and current internal states. For the
circuit to evaluate true, all conditions of previous states
must be true. The circuit will fail if the current state is not
positively completed. That is, the investigator should revisit
previous states in the process for completeness. If any of
the previous states fail to complete, the investigator will not
be able to continue the investigation. For example, in a
digital investigation process ‘data extraction’ from the sus-
pected digital media must be completed before evidence
can be discovered during ‘examination and analyses’ or in a
more simple way data must be extracted before examin-
ation and analyses could start. Therefore, the adopted
sequential notation is illustrated as:
Digital Forensics Process Model ¼ start⇒next⇒then…::endf g
In certain models where sub-processes are indicated,
the same sequential notations will be illustrated for each
process and its corresponding sub-processes. Parallel
processes are indicated by ∥, while iterations or a previ-
ous processes that should be repeated are indicated by
⇔. This is to show similarities and differences within the
sequence of activities when conducting a digital forensic
investigation. The selected digital and cloud forensic
process models include:
The Abstract Digital Forensic Process Model (ADFPM)
[18] was developed based on the Digital Forensic Research
Workshop model [19]. It consists of nine processes in-
cluding Identification, Preparation, Approach strategy,
Preservation, Collection, Examination, Analysis, Presenta-
tion and Returning evidence. It adds three more processes
and describes what each one of them is concerned with.
This ADFPM is represented as:
ADFPM ¼ fIdentification⇒Preparation⇒Approach strategy⇒
Preservation⇒Collection⇒Examination⇒Analysis⇒
Presentation⇒Returning Evidenceg:
The Integrated Digital Investigation Process Model
(IDIPM) [20] was introduced based on the crime scene
theory for physical investigations. It allows technical
Table 1 A comparison of typical cloud delivery model control
levels
Cloud
Delivery
Model
Typical Level of
Control Granted
to CSCs
Typical Functionality Made
Available to CSCs
SaaS Usage and usage-
related configuration
Access to front-end user-interface
PaaS Limited administrative Moderate level of administrative
control over IT resources relevant
to cloud consumer’s usage of
platform
IaaS Full administrative Full access to virtualized infrastructure-
related IT resources and, possibly, to
underlying physical IT resources
Table 2 Cloud consumers and cloud providers responsibilities
in relation to the cloud delivery models
Cloud Delivery
Model
Common CSCs Activities Common CSPs Activities
SaaS Use and configure cloud. Implement, manage, and
maintain cloud service.
Monitor usage by CSCs.
PaaS Develop, test, deploy,
and manage cloud
services and cloud-based
solutions.
Pre-configure platform
and provision underlying
infrastructure, middleware,
and other needed IT
resources, as necessary.
Monitor usage by CSCs.
IaaS Set up and configure
bare infrastructure and
install, manage, and
monitor any needed
software.
Provision and manage the
physical processing storage
networking and hosting
required.
Monitors usage by CSCs.
Moussa et al. Journal of Cloud Computing: Advances, Systems and Applications  (2018) 7:1 Page 3 of 19
requirements for each phase to be developed and for the
interactions between the physical and digital investigations
to be identified. This framework consists of 17 phases or-
ganized into five groups: Readiness, Deployment, Physical
crime scene investigation, Digital crime scene investiga-
tion and Review. Those groups and phases of IDIPM are
listed as:
IDIPM ¼ fReadiness⇒Deployment⇒Physical Crime Investigation∥
Digital Crime Investigation⇒Reviewg
Where
Readiness ¼ Operations Readiness⇒Infrastructure Readinessf g
Deployment ¼ fDetection and Notification⇒Confirmation and
Authorization phaseg
Physical Crime Invest ¼ fPhysical Preparation⇒Physical Survey⇒
Physical Documentation⇒Physical Search⇔
Physical Reconstruction⇒Physical Presentationg
Digital Crime Invest ¼ fDigital Preservation⇒Digital Survey⇒
Documentation⇒Digital Search⇔Digital
Reconstruction⇒Digital Presentationg:
The Enhanced Digital Investigation Process model
(EDIPM) [21] separates the investigations at primary
and secondary crime scenes while depicting the pro-
cesses as iterative, instead of linear. It was introduced
based on the IDIPM model and expands the Deploy-
ment process into Physical and Digital crime investiga-
tions while introducing the Primary crime scene process.
However, the reconstruction is only made after all inves-
tigations have been taken place. This EDIPM is given as:
EDIPM ¼ Readiness⇔Deployment⇔Trackback⇔Dynamite⇔Reviewf g
Where
Readiness ¼ Operations Readiness⇒Infrastructure Readinessf g
Deployment ¼ fDetection and Notification⇒Physical Investigation⇒
Digital Investigation⇒Confirmation⇒Submissiong
Trackback ¼ Digital Investigation⇒Authorizationf g
Dynamite ¼ fPhysical Investigation⇒Digital Investigation⇒
Reconstruction⇒Communicationg:
The Hierarchical, Objectives Based Process Model
(HOBPM) [22], proposes a multi-layer, hierarchical
model, which includes objectives-based processes and
sub-processes that are applicable to various layers of
abstraction, and to which additional layers of detail
can easily be added, as needed. The model includes
the processes of Preparation, Incident response, Data
collection, Data analysis, Presentation of findings and
Incident closure. This HOBPM is sequentially repre-
sented as:
HOBPM ¼ fPreparation⇒Incident Response⇒Data Collection⇒
Data Analysis⇒Presentation⇒Incident Closureg
Where
Data Analysis ¼ Survey⇔Extraction⇔Examination⇔Surveyf g:
The Digital Forensic Process Model (DFPM) [23]
proposed by NIST. It consists of four processes includ-
ing Collection, Examination, Analysis and Reporting.
In this model, the investigation process transforms
media into evidence for law enforcement or for organi-
zation’s internal usage. First, the collected data is ex-
amined, extracted from media and transformed into a
format that can be processed by forensic tools. Subse-
quently, the data is transformed into information
through analysis and finally the information is trans-
formed into evidence during the reporting process.
The DFPM is given as:
DFPM ¼ Collection⇒Examination⇒Analysis⇒Reportingf g
Where
Data collection ¼ fIdentifying Possible Sources of Data⇒Acquiring the
Data⇒Incident Response Considerationsg:
The Digital Forensic Investigation Process Model
(DFIPM) proposed in [24] groups and merges the
same activities that provide the same output into an
appropriate process. The model simplifies the existing
complex process models. It can be used as a generic
model for investigating all incident cases without
tampering with the evidence and protecting the chain
of custody. The model consists of five processes in-
cluding Preparation, Collection and Preservation,
Examination and Analysis, Presentation and Reporting
and Disseminating the case. This DFIPM is given as:
DFIPM ¼ fPreparation⇒Collection and Preservation⇒Examination
and Analysis⇒Presentation and Reporting⇒Disseminationg:
The Digital Forensic Evidence Examination Process
Model (DFEEPM) [25] defined nine processes
including Identification, Collection, Preservation,
Transportation, Storage, Analysis (interpretation and
attribution), Reconstruction, Presentation and De-
struction. All of these should be done in a manner
that meets the legal standards of the jurisdiction and
the case. The DFEEPM is a linear model and is repre-
sented as:
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DFEEPM ¼ fIdentification⇒Collection⇒Preservation⇒Transportation
⇒Storage⇒Analysis⇒Reconstruction⇒Presentation⇒
Destructiong
Where
Analysis ¼ Interpretation⇒Attributionf g:
The Harmonized Digital Forensic Investigation Process
Model (HDFIPM) [26] was introduced in 2012 and pro-
posed several actions to be performed constantly in paral-
lel with the processes of the model in order to achieve
efficiency of investigation and ensure the admissibility of
digital evidence. This model is categorized into five higher
abstraction levels of digital investigation process classes
including readiness class, initialization class, acquisition
class and investigative class. The readiness class deals with
pre-investigative processes aimed at digital forensic pre-
paredness within an organization. Sixteen other processes
are categorized among the remaining three classes in
terms of scope, functions and order. These include inci-
dent detection, first response, planning and preparation
referred to as initialization process class. Potential digital
evidence identification, Potential digital evidence collec-
tion, Potential digital evidence acquisition, Potential digital
evidence transportation and Potential digital evidence
storage are grouped under the Acquisition class. Finally,
the Investigative class contains Evidence acquisition, Evi-
dence examination and analysis, Evidence interpretation,
Reporting, Presentation and Investigation closure pro-
cesses. The HDFIPM is considered as a standard model in
some researches and is therefore represented as follows:
HDFIPM ¼ ffReadiness class⇒Initialization class⇒Acquisitive class⇒
Investigative classg∥fObtaining authorization∥Documentation∥
Managing information flow∥Preserving chain of custody∥
Preserving digital evidence∥Interaction with physical investigationgg
Where
Readiness class ¼ Planning⇒Implementation⇒Assessmentf g
Initialization class ¼ fIncident detection⇒First response⇒Planning
⇒Preparationg
Acquisitive class ¼ fEvidence identification⇒Evidence Collection⇒
Evidence acquisition⇒Evidence transportation⇒
Evidence Storageg
Investigative class ¼ fEvidence acquisition⇒Evidence examination
and analysis⇒Evidence interpretation⇒
Reporting⇒Presentation⇒Investigation closureg:
The Forensic Investigations Process Model in Cloud
Environments (FIPMCE) [15] was introduced based on
the DFPM model. Due to the evolution of cloud com-
puting the processes were changed to apply basic foren-
sic principles and processes. It consists of four processes
including Determining the purpose of the forensics re-
quirement, Identifying the types of cloud services (SaaS,
IaaS, PaaS), Determining the type of background tech-
nology used, and Examining the various physical and
logical locations, (client, server or developer sides). The
FIPMCE is given as:
FIPMCE ¼ fDetermine purpose of the investigation⇒Identify type of
cloud service used⇒Determine type of technology used
⇒Examine various physical and logical locationg
Where
Examine various physical and logical locations ¼ fConsumer side∥
Provider side∥Developer sideg:
The Integrated Conceptual Digital Forensic Process
Model for Cloud Computing (ICDFPMCC) [27] was
proposed based on the frameworks of McKemmish
and National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Its focus is on the differences in the preservation of
forensic data and the collection of cloud computing
data for forensic purposes. It consists of four stages,
which are, Identification and Preservation, Collection,
Examination and Analysis, and finally Reporting and
Presentation. The utility of the ICDFPMCC is vali-
dated in a number of researches and is represented as
follows:
ICDFPMCC ¼ fIdentification and Preservation⇔fCollection⇒
Examination and Analysisg⇒Reporting and Presentationg:
The Cloud Storage Forensics Process Model (CSFPM)
[28] was introduced based on the intelligence analysis
cycle and DFPM model. It includes processes such as
Commence (Scope), Preparation and Response, Identifi-
cation and Collection, Preservation, Analysis, Presenta-
tion, Feedback and Complete. The CSFPM is given as:
CSFPM ¼ fCommence⇒Prepare and Respond⇔Identify and collect⇒
Preserve⇒Analyze⇒Present⇒Feedback⇒Completeg:
The Cloud Network Forensics Process Model (CNFPM)
[9] has five horizontal processes that interact with a man-
agement process, which is needed as a central point of
control. The processes of the model are adopted from the
DFPM model introduced by NIST [23]. The processes
represent independent tasks with regards to the investiga-
tion of an incident. This generic process model is devel-
oped to remotely analyze network traffic in the IaaS
environment. All processes of this model take place within
the cloud, and the consumers are provided with an inter-
face to request forensics data. The processes of this model
include Data Collection, Separation, Aggregation, Analysis
and Reporting controlled by a Management Console.
Authors of this CNFPM has implemented its prototype in
Moussa et al. Journal of Cloud Computing: Advances, Systems and Applications  (2018) 7:1 Page 5 of 19
an OpenNebula-based IaaS environment and is repre-
sented as follows:
CNFPM ¼ ffData Collection⇒Separation⇒Aggregation⇒
Analysis⇒Reportingg⇔Managementg:
The Open Cloud Forensic Process Model (OCFPM)
most recently proposed in [29] is supposed to continuously
be supported by the CSPs. The model is built based on the
DFPM model and defines six processes such as Preserva-
tion, Identification (Incident and Evidence), Collection,
Organization (Examination and Analysis), Preservation and
Verification. Both Identification and Organization processes
have sub-processes. This OCFPM is given as:
OCFPM ¼ fPreservation⇒Identification⇒Collection⇒Organization
⇒Presentation⇒Verificationg
Where
Identification ¼ Incident⇒Evidencef g
Organization ¼ Examination⇒Analysisf g:
Based on the above reviewed digital and cloud forensic
process models, the authors propose the live forensic
process model intended to lead the CFaaS model. The
process model is briefly discussed in the following section.
Proposed live cloud forensic process model
In order to identify a suitable cloud forensic process,
existing digital and cloud forensic process models have
been reviewed in Section 3. In this light, it is obvious
that some existing models follow similar methods while
others move into different methods of investigation, but
the outcomes in most occasions are almost the same.
Based on the suggestions and drawbacks highlighted in
the reviewed models, authors have designed a new ‘Live
Cloud Forensic Process Model’ shown in Fig. 1. The
model consists of the following processes:
Initiate response
CSCs organizations will either need dedicated first re-
sponders, or a staff awareness system backed up by a
helpline, so that when an incident occurs, a local im-
mediate assessment can be done to its resource. At
this stage, the process of confirming whether the inci-
dent is real or a ‘false alarm’ should begin, even
though this can be a conclusion at any later process
in the investigation.
Scenario
The scenario consists of a predefined proper risk as-
sessment conducted to the local infrastructure of the
CSCs, the history of breaches that have occurred on the
infrastructure of the CSPs, and legal policies and bylaws
that the cloud CSPs abides by, so that the CSCs can
achieve an optimal scenario definition. Based on the
scenario, a decision is made about which specific ap-
proach can be used for the case being investigated. This
also equips the investigator with the best practices and
procedures which are usually adopted by cloud foren-
sics practitioners. To specify the case, the scenario may
define the evidence that is most likely related to that
precise digital crime. The scenario also specifies loca-
tions to look for and tools to be run for specific digital
evidence.
Fig. 1 Live Cloud Forensic Process Model
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Classify investigation
In classifying the investigation, the incident response
team should confer with local staff (and with legal ad-
visers if necessary), in order to correctly classify the in-
vestigation type, as early as possible. This will help to
select the appropriate plan from the scenario at hand. It
is especially important to identify the overall incident, as
this tends to help in the decision making process.
Notify law enforcement
Meanwhile, the notification of law enforcement involves
referring a case to the appropriate LEAs or other author-
ities as soon as that course of action is considered ap-
propriate. That decision should usually be made by the
management of the organization after consulting with
their legal advisers if necessary.
Identify sources
Identify Sources refers to the first process of cloud investi-
gation, and deals with identifying all possible sources of
evidence in a cloud environment in order to prove that
the incident took place. This process is crucial, because
the next processes depend upon the evidence sources
identified here.
Collect evidence
In this process forensics local investigators of the CSCs
are supposed to start collecting digital evidence after
their sources have been identified and isolated. Based on
the delivery type and technology of the utilized cloud
service model, the data collection can be implemented
in the following two areas:
Consumer side evidence collection
The two primary areas for evidence collection on the
cloud consumer side are devices and networks used by
the users to access cloud services. In other words, foren-
sic data that can be found at the consumer premises
may either be data stored in a device or data flowing
through local network of the consuming organization.
Usually, the kind of forensic data that can be extracted
from a device residing on the premises of the CSCs may
include history logs, temp data, the registry, access logs,
chat logs, session data and persistent cookies that can be
found on the web browsers through which the CSCs are
accessing their adopted cloud services [15]. Similarly,
network forensic data may also include filesystems, pro-
cesses and network traffic. Therefore, once potential
sources of digital evidence in the CSCs is identified, live
digital evidence is immediately collected in a forensically
sound manner.
Provider side evidence collection
Likewise, many forensic data that form a critical part of
forensic data are created at the CSPs side. These forensic
data, which are at the custody of the CSPs may include
system logs, application logs, user authentication and ac-
cess information, database logs etc. CSPs side forensic
data may also include virtual disk data and physical
memory data pertaining to particular virtual machine,
host logs and Application Programming Interface (API)
logs. Therefore, it is essential that this evidence is col-
lected remotely by an investigator situated at the prem-
ises of the provider.
Correlate data
The next process is Correlation, where due to the dis-
tributed nature of cloud computing, perfect time
synchronization between all cloud environments is al-
most impossible. As a result, the time of an incident
may differ from device to device. Thus, timestamps
from different sources of forensic data in the cloud en-
vironment can be misleading or deceptive. Hence, this
process correlates and visualizes the logical relation-
ship among forensically interesting digital objects col-
lected from CSCs and CSPs sides. The overall vision
behind this process is to create a uniform timeline for
the collection of forensic data in response to incidents
pertaining to cloud.
Examine and analyze
In the meantime, Examine – Analyze, involves inspec-
tion and extraction of crucial digital evidence from the
huge amount of forensic data collected in previous pro-
cesses. In this process, extracted crucial digital evidence
is analyzed with different tools to reveal any useful infor-
mation that may prove if someone is guilty or not. Pre-
liminary event reconstruction may also take place in this
process.
Report
Reporting is the last process which deals with the pres-
entation of the evidence in a court of law. In this regard,
a well-documented report that contains the findings and
an expert testimony should be produced on the analysis
of the evidence. Since cloud computing is a very compli-
cated environment to understand, especially for ordinary
Internet users, the findings should hence be presented in
a way that the jury would understand.
Legal and sontractual review
Meanwhile, the process of Legal and Contractual Review
runs concurrently with all other processes, here, CSCs
should develop a set of SLA requirements that may im-
prove the qualities of forensics readiness, and most im-
portantly may render the ability of consumers to rely on
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CSPs to collect and store valid and admissible evidence.
These requirements should enable contractual obliga-
tions that are demanded by CSCs from their CSPs. If an
SLA does not state the type of process or forensic data
that will be provided for its CSCs, then, the CSPs have
no contractual duties to offer such information. Conse-
quently, lack of a comprehensive SLA may lower the
quality of the best evidence available and cause lack of
access to forensics data. Thus, the SLA contract should
govern what type of forensic evidence should be col-
lected and the process of its storage.
Documentation and preservation
The Documentation and Preservation process runs
concurrently with all other processes. It includes listing
the organization’s digital evidence by category, location,
and the custodian or stewardship. Similarly, it includes
taking notes about details on digital evidence storage,
accessibility, associated retention policies and proce-
dures created to preserve the chain of custody. Creating
this list is increasingly important as the volume of evi-
dence within the CSCs grow. Therefore, organizations
should consider developing the appropriate evidence
preservation plan in advance, with flexibility built in for
exceptional circumstances. These may include preserv-
ing potential evidence locally or preserving them in an-
other cloud on a dedicated litigation hold server.
Related work
Cloud forensics solutions have been proposed by many
researchers over the past five years. Some researchers
simply present concepts while others provide details on
how a solution can be implemented in practice in cloud
environments. This section discusses some research works
that are aimed at investigating cloud environments. The
focus of current studies on cloud forensics can be classi-
fied into five categories, including cloud forensic readi-
ness, cloud forensics process models, evidence collection
and acquisition, evidence examination and analysis and
cloud-based technical and conceptual solutions.
Cloud forensics readiness
Consumer and provider side cloud forensic readiness is
a solution for most of the issues and challenges pertaining
to cloud forensic. Kirsten and Barbara [30] proposed a the-
oretical approach to proactively collect evidence from cloud
environments claiming that cloud forensics readiness calls
upon technological and organizational strategies to address
the risks that threaten organizational information. The re-
searchers offered a conceptual framework for making deci-
sions about how to identify and manage the increasing
quantity of evidence collected in clouds. They integrated
best practices from the Record Management discipline and
an Organizational Network Forensics Readiness model
proposed by [31] to achieve the proposed cloud forensics
readiness. A cyclic model proposed in their research
consists of four phases, including Continuity of evi-
dence, Patterns of evidence, Weight of evidence, and
Manifestation of evidence. The model is not validated
by practically applying it to the cloud, instead the re-
searchers applied the model to a set of cloud forensic
issues raised in a research conducted in [13].
Sibiya et al. proposed an integrated cloud forensics
readiness model that uses a security as a service model,
a cloud model, and a digital forensics as a service model.
In this model the consumer should always access cloud
resources through security as a service model and invoke
digital forensics as a service model to achieve cloud foren-
sics readiness. The authors implemented their model in a
private cloud scenario (Nimbula directory) to demonstrate
its potential utility [32].
Philip M Trenwith and H.S. Venter proposed a cloud
forensics readiness model that uses remote and central-
ized logging in an attempt to improve the integrity of
stored evidence, and to overcome jurisdiction issues that
a cloud forensics investigator may face. The researchers
implemented the proposed model in a proof of concept
prototype on a client and server applications that consist
of a windows service [33].
Lucia De Marco et al. presented a cloud forensics readi-
ness system to provide a manner of implementing forensics
readiness capability in cloud environments. The system
includes several modules that perform dedicated operations
interconnected via dedicated open virtualization format
communication channels. The researchers implemented
the model in OpenStack project. In another study, the
researchers considered formalization of a co-signed
SLA for cloud forensics readiness. The SLA is com-
posed of a set of clauses that are fed as an input to their
cloud forensics readiness system [34, 35].
Makutsoane et al. proposed a Cloud Capability Decision
Framework (C2DF) that can be used by CSCs to achieve a
certain level of confidence in the CSPs they select, with re-
gard to their forensics readiness. The framework employs
risk analysis tools and techniques as resource for cloud
consuming organization, when migrating to the cloud, to
assess the cloud forensics readiness solution of CSPs. The
framework follows four sequential phases, including
evaluation of the CSCs, evaluation of the CSPs, alignment
of the CSPs with a digital forensics readiness model, and
lastly selection of the CSPs. The researchers did not prag-
matically test the framework within an industry environ-
ment [36].
Evidence collection and acquisition
Evidence collection and acquisition deals with identifica-
tion of potential sources of digital evidence and the means
of acquiring it from cloud computing resources. Several
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researchers have participated in efforts to define tools and
techniques for the use of digital forensics in the cloud en-
vironments. Dykstra and Sherman discussed a method for
collecting digital evidence from Amazon’s Elastic Comput-
ing Cloud (EC2) service in the context of conducting
cloud forensics using both conventional digital forensics
tools and Amazon’s export features. They also used Euca-
lyptus to inject forensics tools into running virtual ma-
chines via the hypervisor layer using virtual machine
introspection techniques. In addition, by using tools such
as Encase and AccessData’s Forensics Tool Kit (FTK), they
successfully collected evidence from both Amazon and
Eucalyptus. They also explained levels of trust required in
the cloud service models to execute evidence collection
procedures [5].
Corrado Federici proposed a cloud data imager and used
it for collecting digital evidence from Dropbox, Google
Drive and Microsoft SkyDrive. With the cloud data imager
he could display the file hierarchy, and was able to logically
collect data from those three cloud storage products. The
tool achieved this, by providing read-only access to the
cloud service primarily and, then, by using Secure Hyper-
text Transfer Protocol (HTTPs) requests and Open Au-
thentication (OAuth) tokens, each specific to the individual
cloud storage product being examined [37].
Kurt Oestreicher proposed an effective means for forensic
acquisition of data stored on a cloud service. He collected
and examined forensic data from Apple’s iCloud when used
on an OS X personal computer. He created two identical
virtual machines representing the subject computer and
examination computer. A new iCloud account was created,
new iCloud data was created on the subject machine, and
the data were synchronized with the cloud service. The sec-
ond virtual machine acting as the examiner was synchro-
nized with the newly created iCloud account. Representing
an examiner performing live forensic acquisition, files cre-
ated on the subject system were downloaded and analyzed.
The downloaded files were found complete and forensically
sound because Message Digest 5 (MD5) hash values and
timestamps matched [38].
In an attempt to provide digital forensic practitioners
with an overview of the capability of mobile forensics
tools in acquiring forensic data from cloud-of-things
devices, Cahyani et al. have undertaken a research on
the extent that three popular mobile forensics tools may
acquire forensics data from three Windows phone devices.
They examined the Nokia Lumia 900, the Nokia Lumia 625
and the Nokia Lumia 735 against the Paraben Device
Seizure v7.0, XRY forensic Pack v6.13.0 and the Cellebrite
UFED Touch v4.1.2.8. In this study, researchers also exam-
ined the effects of the settings modification and alternative
acquisition processes on the acquisition results. As a result,
the researchers have determined that the power status of
the mobile devices matter because a data alteration issue
may occur if the device power state was not correctly han-
dled at the beginning of the acquisition process. The result
also revealed that support for Windows Phone devices by
the tested mobile forensic tools was still limited [39].
Evidence examination and analysis
Evidence examination and analysis deals with the tools
and techniques used to discover relevant evidence from
forensic data and reconstructing a sequence of events to
answer questions pertinent to cloud forensics cases. The
cloud forensics community has contributed to a number
of tools and techniques to cope with the issues related
to analyzing digital evidence collected from cloud envi-
ronments. Anwar et al. generated their own dataset by
attacking open source Eucalyptus with known cloud
attacks and further analyzed built-in logs and third-
party-application logs. They simulated an HTTP Denial
of Service (DoS) attack in a virtualized environment on
the Eucalyptus cloud controller. They proposed and dis-
cussed potential snort rules for detecting an HTTP DoS at-
tack on the Eucalyptus. They also highlighted relevant log
entries on the cloud controller as a result of the attack [40].
Fabio et al. formulated a case study to analyze foren-
sics evidence stored in a Window 7 personal computer
when Google documents, PicasaWeb, Flickr, and Drop-
box are accessed via web browser. The researchers also
analyzed when the Dropbox client is installed in a local
synchronized folder. They performed the test twice, the
former with live forensics tools on a powered on laptop
running Windows 7 and the latter with postmortem fo-
rensic tools on a physical image of its hard drive [41].
Jason Hale analyzed forensic data created by an Amazon
Cloud Drive accessed via web browsers and its desktop
application. Potential digital evidence was found in the
web history, windows registry and log files on the test in-
stallations and uninstallations. As a result, he proposed
methods to follow when determining what files were
transferred to and from an Amazon Cloud Drive [42].
Quick and Choo conducted three studies to identify
evidence that is likely to remain after the use of major
cloud storage products, such as SkyDrive, Google Drive
and Dropbox on Windows and on iOS devices using
common forensic tools. They located a range of evidence
across the devices, including SQLite databases, log files,
registry entries, thumb cache data, link files and browser
history. They also conducted live forensics to determine
whether artifacts of interest could be located via memory
analysis and network interception [43–45].
Shariati et al. analyzed the possible forensic data left
behind on the consumer devices when the Ubuntu One
cloud storage service is utilized. This study gave a special
focus on the analysis of both volatile and nonvolatile
data present after utilizing Ubuntu One on different
platforms, such as Windows 8.1, Mac OS X 10.9, and
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iOS 7.04. The researchers showed that they were able to
locate a range of distinct data, but they found that access
to valuable forensic data, such as authentication and
user action logs, varied between platforms [46].
Cloud forensics process models
Cloud forensics processes deal with establishing theoretical
forensic processes and procedures that must be put in place
to guarantee the integrity of evidence throughout an inves-
tigation. The cloud forensic process models may also define
fundamental forensics principles for the development of
new tools and techniques. Chae Cho et al. proposed a high-
level guidance on the forensic analysis of the well-known
Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS). Processes sug-
gested in this model include identification, live collection
and analysis, and static collection and analysis [47].
Hong and Ting proposed a process model based on a
traditional digital forensics model [23]. The process model
proposed in this study consists of four processes, includ-
ing determine the purpose of the forensic requirements,
identify the types of cloud services, determine the type of
background technology and finally examine physical and
logical locations of digital evidence. The researchers di-
vided process number four into three location of focus,
such as client side, provider side and developer side [15].
Hyunji et al. proposed relatively detailed procedures
for investigating cloud storage services to determine the
forensic data that can be collected from four popular
public cloud services, such as Amazon’s Simple Storage
Service (S3), Dropbox, Evernote and Google Docs. Each
cloud service has been analyzed with four major operat-
ing systems, including Windows, Mac OS, iOS, and An-
droid. The researchers prioritized four sources of digital
evidence for cloud forensics investigations, including log
file of web browser, data of client application in personal
computer, data in smartphones, and physical memory of
the system in question [48].
Theodoros and Vasilios proposed an acquisition process
and scenarios to meet challenges pertaining to the acquisi-
tion of evidence from cloud environments. Different from
other proposed process models the researchers claim the
deployment of evidence correlation right from the begin-
ning of a cloud storage forensics is a plausible scenario
that will prove or disprove the allegation. The researchers
also discussed that cloud forensics readiness is vital and
mandatory to significantly decrease the cost and time of
digital evidence acquisition. However, they highlight that
cloud forensics readiness could only happen from the
CSPs side, which comes as a result of a lack of awareness
of the cloud consumers to interfere. The acquisition
process proposed in this research starts by identifying
the evidence source followed by evidence collection.
After identifying and collecting the valuable digital evi-
dence, investigators can deploy traditional digital forensics
processes in order to recover, examine, and record conclu-
sions drawn from the examination. Finally, digital evidence
recovered from CSCs and CSPs sides can be correlated in
order to draw conclusions about the suspect’s activities to
prove the case [49].
Martin et al. also proposed an integrated cloud forensics
process model with which they conducted a server and cli-
ent analysis of an ownCloud private storage as a service
product. With this four-stage cloud forensics model they
collected a range of client software data, including file data
and metadata and authentication credentials of the cloud
consumer. Using the credentials collected from the client,
they analyzed server components and were able to decrypt
files stored on the server. In a recent study, for further val-
idation, they analyzed the XtreemFS distributed file system
to determine the proper methods for forensic examination
of file systems that commonly underlie cloud systems. The
researchers have shown that there are significant complica-
tions introduced by the use of distributed file systems, when
collecting evidence from cloud systems. Finally, they sug-
gested that practitioners should analyze the cloud system
directory to locate relevant metadata and object storage
components for collection of particular volumes or user
files [27, 50, 51]. Guided by this process model Thethi and
Anthony evaluated AccessData’s FTK as a forensics tool for
collecting evidence from Amazon’s EC2 cloud. They con-
ducted an experiment using a case study that could be
analogous to a real-world case involving cloud evidence
[52]. Finally, Daryabar et al. in their recent work guided by
this process model analyzed a range of forensic artifacts
arising from user activities which could be forensically re-
covered from smartphones when the MEGA cloud client
app is utilized. Their main focus remained on identifying
the potential forensic evidence that can be recovered from
the Android and iOS platforms. In this light, they also stud-
ied the modifications that may happen to the file content
or metadata during uploading and downloading process,
which may affect preservation of evidence, on Android and
iOS platforms [53].
Quick et al. proposed a seven phased process model,
upon which they conducted analysis to client-side artifacts
for three cloud storage products to determine whether
files were inadvertently modified during collection from
these cloud storage services. They realized that file con-
tent remained unchanged; however, timestamp data chan-
ged based on download sources and timestamp type [28].
Gebhardt and Reiser proposed a cloud network foren-
sics process model. The researchers implemented the
model using OpenNabula platform and the Xplico ana-
lysis for validation. The model provides remote network
forensics mechanism to CSCs, and ensures separation of
consumers in a multi-tenant environment [9].
Martini and Choo proposed another six-step process,
upon which they conducted an in-depth identification
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process to establish the forensic data and metadata that
could be collected by utilizing vCloud’s RESTful API.
The researchers concluded that the majority of the fo-
rensic data that they identified could be collected via
API in a programmable way [54].
D. Povar and G. Geethakumari proposed a heuristic
cloud forensics process model, based on the models pro-
posed in [55] and NIST [23], aimed at enabling forensic
investigators to perform investigations and tool devel-
opers to come up with forensic tools for cloud environ-
ments. This model suggests areas of data collection as
CSCs side data collection and CSPs side data collection.
Likewise, they propose that forensic analysis can either
be done on the CSCs side or at CSPs side [56].
Ab Rahman et al. proposed a cloud incident handling
model by integrating principles and practices from inci-
dent handling and digital forensics. The researchers vali-
dated the model using ownCloud as a case study. In an
extra effort in a recent work, to respond to the increased
volume of forensic data and the sophisticated attacks
targeting cloud services, the model was later enhanced
to a cloud incident handling and forensics-by-design
model. The efficacy of the model was then demonstrated
by using Google Drive, Dropbox, and OneDrive [57–60].
Zawoad et al. defined cloud forensics as ‘the science of
preserving all evidence possible while ensuring the privacy
and integrity of the information, identification, collection,
organization, presentation, and verification of evidence to
determine the facts about an incident involving clouds’.
The researchers discussed the reliability of digital evi-
dence, considering that the CSCs, CSPs and the forensics
investigators involved in a case can all be malicious en-
tities. Therefore, they defined a continuous model that
verifies the reliability of forensic data extracted from cloud
environments [29].
Simou et al. proposed a cloud forensics process model
similar to the digital investigation process model proposed
by Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) [19].
Based on the suggestions and drawbacks located from the
investigation of similar approaches presented before it. The
researchers propose the inclusion of a collection process
into the preservation process, secondly, they grouped the
analysis process and examination process and finally the
decision process is excluded [61].
Cloud-based technical and conceptual solutions
These technical and conceptual solutions are proposed
by academia and industry researchers to equip cloud
forensics practitioners and cloud providers with sys-
tems. Most of the systems are mostly designed for
postmortem investigations. Similarly, the systems are
mostly designed in a way that they can be integrated
into the cloud environments.
Cheng Yan proposed a conceptual framework that is
similar to anti-virus software [62]. Considering the cloud
as the core of the forensics system, the researchers in-
stalled an analysis engine in the cloud to communicate
with every server in the cloud to collect both volatile
and non-volatile data. The engine has a real-time moni-
tor with data acquisition and analysis functions to collect
and analyze cybercrime activities in the cloud. When un-
usual behavior is detected, evidence will be collected on
the relevant cloud server or client.
In addition, in order to protect the digital evidence,
from contamination and loss of continuity, Delport et al.
proposed methods to isolate suspected cloud instances
in cloud environments. The researchers discussed the
benefits and challenges of several means of isolating crime
scene (instance, under investigation) in the cloud, includ-
ing relocating the instance manually or automatically, ser-
ver farming, collecting evidence from a failover instance,
address relocation, sandboxing instances, using man-in-
the-middle analysis on cloud virtual machines, and follow-
ing a “let’s hope for the best” approach, which involves
imaging the relevant cloud nodes in a similar manner to
traditional forensics [63].
Meanwhile, Raffael Marty discussed the logging chal-
lenges associated with cloud computing and proposed a
guideline to address those challenges. In addition to dis-
cussing the logging challenges a logging architecture,
and a set of guidelines which are applicable to multiple
types of cloud implementations were proposed. The
guideline is mainly on when, what and how to log. Marty
implemented the conceptual logging architecture in an
SaaS model, providing detailed configuration require-
ments to ensure that the log data in target are properly
logged for forensics [64].
Dykstra and Sherman proposed a Forensics acquisition
suite for OpenStack Tools (FROST), a toolkit for Open-
Stack IaaS cloud model. FROSTallows remote CSCs to col-
lect an image of their virtual machines. Similarly, it allows
to the CSCs to retrieve log events for API requests and fire-
wall logs for virtual machines. With the use of FROST, the
CSCs can authenticate all of the evidence collected by using
cryptographic hashes. Consequently, FROST has been inte-
grated with the various OpenStack dashboard and compute
components. After validation, the researchers suggested
that the toolkit performance overhead is acceptable. Other
researchers of this domain referred FROST as one of the
most advanced IaaS data collection toolkit published to
date [65].
Zawoad et al. proposed a Secure-Logging-as-a-Service
(SecLaaS) system designed for collecting forensic logs
from the cloud [66]. The researchers implemented the
logging systems with OpenStack and Snort. They sug-
gested that the logging system requires minimal
overhead.
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In a new study, Zawoad et al. also defined a model of
trustworthy litigation hold management for cloud storage
systems. Based on the model, a trustworthy litigation hold
enabled cloud storage system (LINCS) has been proposed.
The system verifies any deliberate destruction of evidence
after a litigation hold is triggered. According to [7], LINCS
can be implemented with low system overhead.
Patrascu and Patriciu proposed a method to monitor
the activities in cloud environments by running a secure
cloud forensics framework. The main goal of this frame-
work is to gather forensic log data from all virtual machines
running inside the virtualization layer. It provides an inter-
face between the forensic investigator and the monitored
virtual machines. This cloud logging system consists of five
layers, including Management, Virtualization, Storage, Pro-
cessing and Data layers [67].
Finally, Alqahtany et al. proposed a framework claimed
to enable CSCs to collect and analyze forensics evidence
without the consent of the CSPs. The model uses an
agent-based approach that is held in each virtual machine.
The agents send the required evidence to a central cloud
forensic acquisition and analysis system in the CSPs envir-
onment. The communication between the two components
is provided through a communication engine. The system
uses cryptography to ensure the confidentiality and integ-
rity of the forensic data. The researchers believe that the
framework might cause additional performance overhead.
However, this framework has not been tested in a cloud
environments [11].
Proposed cloud forensics as a service
In this study, the authors conceived a CFaaS system
composed of three basic components, Forensics Data
Manager (FDM), Forensic Application/Analysis Manager
(FAM) and Forensics Workflow Manager (FWM) as shown
in Fig. 2. In this regard, the CFaaS model is exposed as a
service through one or more service interfaces. With the
use of this system, consumers, providers and LEA investiga-
tors can process, analyze and archive forensics data with
improved efficiencies and increased productivity.
The FDM retrieves, uploads, and stores forensic data
for the use by the FAM. The FDM should be able to extract
the relevant data and logs with the help of live, as well as
static data acquisition techniques. Inherently, it collects
forensic data from all sources in the cloud infrastructure.
Consequently, the FAM receives and analyzes forensics
data through collaboration processes in a manner that
can be used by the FWM to generate a forensic report.
Here, the application manager uses dynamic data mining
techniques to segregate the relevant evidence for proving
crime and delivers them to the workflow manager. In
addition, the analysis software utilized in this stage are
created by forensic software vendors and are legally
supported.
Furthermore, it is assumed that FAM as well as FWM
components use algorithms and software known to the
involved parties. Thus, when given the same forensic
data, any party can compute the output of the relevant
forensics analysis.
Trust assumptions and root of trust
Regarding the trustworthiness of the forensics analysis
produced by the components of the CFaaS system, the
difference between unilaterally trusted and mutually trusted
outputs has to be distinguished. A unilaterally trusted out-
put is produced by a party with the help of its own compo-
nent services and is not necessarily trusted by other parties.
The components could be located either within or outside
the party’s environment. In the latter case, the component’s
owner may need to take additional measures, such as the
use of tamper-resistant mechanisms, to protect the compo-
nent and its outputs against modification by other parties
[68, 69]. There are two approaches to producing a mutually
trusted output: (i) A Trusted Third Party (TTP) produces
the output using its own certified infrastructure, or (ii) the
parties concerned use their respective unilaterally trusted
outputs as the basis for agreement on a valid, mutually
trusted output [70]. The latter approach is the main focus
of interest in this study. In this approach, the CSCs and
CSPs need to execute some protocols between them to
produce an agreed upon and non-repudiation output. In-
herently, the mutually trusted outputs produced in this ap-
proach form the “root of trust” for developing trusted
CFaaS system. The source of mutually trusted outputs can
Fig. 2 CFaaS components
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be rooted in any one of the three components constituting
the CFaaS system shown in Fig. 2. Therefore, once a mutu-
ally trusted output source is available, the trustworthiness
of the component services above it becomes irrelevant.
Given the determinacy assumption, a party can always re-
sort to the mutually trusted output to compute and verify
the results produced by other parties. For example, given
an FDM that produces mutually trusted forensic data, the
FAM and FWM services can be provided by any of the par-
ties in any combination; their outputs are verifiable by any
other party.
Bilateral cloud-forensics-as-a-service system
The bilateral cloud forensics system model is an attractive
solution in applications where mutually untrusted CSCs
and CSPs are reluctant, or unable, to use a trusted third
party and therefore, agree to deploy their own component
services. A distinguishing feature of this CFaaS system is
that the CSCs and CSPs own and run their own independ-
ent but functionally equivalent component services to
produce unilaterally trusted outputs. In this regard, a bilat-
eral agreement between the pair of component services
results in the trusted output needed to build the CFaaS
system. This approach leads to two fundamental issues: (i)
how do the CSCs and CSPs collect the forensic data that
are essential to compute unilaterally trusted outputs that
can form the basis for agreement on the forensic investi-
gation, and (ii) how do the CSCs and CSPs resolve con-
flicts over a forensic investigation. Answers to these are
explicitly discussed in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 respectively.
Forensic data collection
In the CFaaS system illustrated in Fig. 2, the FDM repre-
sents the instrumentation that performs the collection of
forensic data. It is assumed that a Forensic Data Col-
lector (FDC) is the component of the FDM that is re-
sponsible for doing digital evidence acquisition. Hence,
the FDC is a piece of software that is possibly in com-
bination with some hardware components which are
used to collect and store the forensic data that are cru-
cial for an incident under investigation. In this regard,
the FDM has different FDCs that hold responsibility for
various forms of the digital evidence acquisition.
As stated in Section 4.6, it is natural that forensic data
pertaining to a cloud computing environment should be
collected from the CSCs and CPSs sides [2, 27, 28, 49, 56].
To collect its unilaterally trusted forensic data with re-
spect to a cloud incident: (i) the CSCs can collect and
analyze forensic data left behind on their client machine
by invoking commands at the CFaaS service interface, and
(ii) the CSCs must collect and analyze forensic data on the
provider side by invoking commands at the CFaaS service
interface.
In contrast, as can be seen in Fig. 3, the CSPs have ac-
cess to the CFaaS system interface, which they expose to
the CSCs, as well as to the resource interface, which they
use for operations on their cloud resources. Consequently,
the CSPs can retrieve the forensic data from its resources
by either using the CFaaS system interface or by directly
collecting the forensic data from its data center through
the resource interface. The CSPs should also be able to
collect the forensic data left on the CSCs side. This makes
eminent that the CSPs should remotely connect to the
CSCs environments and collect forensic data with the help
of the CFaaS system. At this point, it is assumed that the
CSPs can add some FDCs to the browser or to the cloud
client software commonly used by the CSCs to get access
to the cloud services. These FDCs log and preserve the fo-
rensic data, including communication logs and other sen-
sitive data, on the client’s machine.
The preceding discussions highlighted that the ability
of cloud forensics investigation relies on the ability of
the parties involved to independently collect the forensic
data necessary to produce unilaterally trusted output.
Furthermore, as noted before, FDCs may need other
protection mechanisms such as tamper-resistance. In
this light, the discussion will now be generalized.
Figure 4 shows a provider (p), which offers some service
to a consumer (c). FDMC is a consumer’s Forensic Data
Manager. FDMP, refers to a provider’s forensic data man-
ager, while TR stands for Tamper-Resistant protection.
Therefore, FDMC
TR is a consumer forensic data manager
that is tamper-resistant to provider modification, whereas,
FDMP
TR is a provider forensic data manager that is tamper-
Fig. 3 Provider and Consumer of a cloud storage forensics services
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resistant to consumer modification. The outputs of the
FDMs are unilaterally trusted, the FDMC by the consumer
and FDMP by provider, and made available to their respect-
ive forensic application managers in the bigger model of
the CFaaS system. This model implies that the forensic data
should be collected from within the infrastructure of the
consumer and from within the provider side, where the
forensic data of a required degree of accuracy can be
collected from within the consumer and provider envi-
ronments. In this case, the consumer deploys its FDMC
locally, and FDMC
TR to remotely collect forensic data
from the cloud. Likewise, the provider deploys its FDMP lo-
cally in the cloud, and FDMP
TR to remotely collect forensic
data at the infrastructure of the consuming organization.
Agreement on mutually trusted forensics output
Though they are functionally equivalent, consumer and
provider components in the CFaaS system do not neces-
sarily use the same algorithms or input forensic data to
analyze their unilaterally trusted output. As discussed in
Section 6.3, they may use data collected at different inter-
faces to analyze an output. There is then the possibility of
divergence between the unilaterally trusted outputs. To
address this problem, the authors propose the use of a
Comparison and Conflict Resolution Protocol (CCRP). A
suitable protocol that supports:
i. The comparison of independently produced and
unilaterally trusted outcomes to detect potential
divergences;
ii. Where possible, for example, when ∣ Outputp –
Outputc ∣≤ d, (c, p, d stand for consumer,
provider and agreed-upon acceptable divergence,
respectively), the immediate declaration of absence
of conflict;
iii.Where the divergence is greater than d, the
execution of a negotiation protocol between
consumer and provider with the intention of
reaching agreement on a single output;
iv. When the negotiation protocol fails to sort out the
conflict automatically, the declaration of conflict for
off-line resolution and search for neutral body,
which is in this study referred as the LEA.
v. Production of non-repudiable mutually trusted
output to the LEA.
The non-repudiation property is necessary to ensure
that neither the consumer nor the provider can subse-
quently deny execution of the CCRP or the results of that
execution. That is, both sides could not subsequently deny
their agreement or otherwise to a given forensic output that
they submitted to the LEA. Consequently, the LEA needs
to correlate or fuse the different outputs to normalize
the dispute.
In the meantime, the overall vision behind the correl-
ation and fusion services, in the high level architecture
of the proposed CFaaS model depicted in Fig. 5, is to
help the LEA correlate and visualize the divergence per-
taining to the unilaterally trusted forensic outputs discov-
ered by the CSCs and CSPs. It provides the parsing of
multiple forensically interesting objects from the trusted
forensics outputs and correlation between them. Finally, it
pulls together the results to present a hyperlinked inter-
active report. The correlation and fusion service use an in-
ternal database to store and relate the various conceptual
units of the outputs discovered by both sides.
The authors now try to complete the model for bilat-
eral cloud forensics by combining the component services
with execution of the CCRP. Figure 6 shows the model
when forensic data is collected at both CSCs and CSPs (as
in Fig. 4). As before, c and p stand for consumer and pro-
vider. FDM, FAM and FWM stand for forensic data man-
ager, forensic application manager and forensic workflow
manager, respectively. The root of trust is established at the
forensic data manager. This is determined by the level at
which the parties execute the CCRP to agree on a mutually
trusted output. As indicated in section 6.1, the rationale
here is that once a bilaterally trusted output is available, the
CSCs can verify any subsequent forensic analysis. This veri-
fication is orthogonal to the operation of the bilateral CFaaS
system. The model allows for the combination of data from
mixed FDM deployments. That is, the consumer deploys
Fig. 4 Model of bilateral data collection
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FDMC and tamper-resistant FDMP, while the provider de-
ploys FDMP and tamper-resistant FDMC (as in Fig. 4).
Case study: On the feasibility of bilateral cloud
forensic as a service
A Cloud Service Provider (CSP) offers Storage as a Ser-
vice (StaaS) and Cloud Forensics as a Service (CFaaS)
to thousands of consumers. In this light, a Cloud Ser-
vice Consumer (CSC) is using the StaaS to store its
data on the cloud through the CSP, where an attacker
has managed to break into the server hosting the data
and stolen confidential information. After conducting
the initial response to remediate the incident, the CSP
should notify the CSC about the incident, and data col-
lection is initiated to investigate the incident (it is as-
sumed that the CSP and CSC are in the same legal
jurisdiction).
Stakeholders collect the forensics data, analyze and
present the concerned bodies with the report using the
CFaaS system. According to the previous discussion, the
CFaaS systems proposed in the literature are based on
unilaterally trusted out-comes. Ideally, CSC should have
a mechanism to independently investigate the incident
and verify that the CSP is not accidentally or maliciously
modifying the evidence. This would result in a bilateral
CFaaS system.
For this specific scenario of investigating the StaaS
model consumed by an application deployed within the
consumer’s infrastructure, this study envisages a bilateral
CFaaS system based on the abstract model illustrated in
Fig. 1. In this light, forensic data pertaining to an inci-
dent occurred in the StaaS model can literally be col-
lected from the AAA (Authentication, Authorization,
Accountability) logs, hypervisor event logs and storage
server [49]. As discussed in Section 6.1, both CSC and
CSP can collect the necessary forensic data at the CFaaS
interface. In the case of FDMC and FDMP can independ-
ently collect the forensic data and provide to FAMC and
Fig. 5 High Level View of the Bilateral CFaaS
Fig. 6 Bilateral CFaaS model
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FAMP. Given that the forensic data collecting agents are
collecting similar data, the Forensic Analysis Modules
(FAM) of the CFaaS system should arrive at the same re-
sult. Thus, it is more straightforward to bilaterally collect
and analyze evidence from all sources of forensic data
pertaining to the StaaS model.
In the case of the CSP it is collecting the potential evi-
dence through the resource interface, this allows the
CSP to more directly collect potential evidence. This
does not allow the FDMC to collect the same forensic
data independently. As suggested in section 6.3, this may
lead to different strategies for the collection of forensic
data by FDMC and FDMP. For example, FDMC of a CSC
can proactively collect provenance metadata of the data
transferred to and from the StaaS. The FAMC locally im-
plemented in the premises of the CSC can then use the
forensic data which has been proactively collected by the
FDMC to analyze the incident. However, it is very likely
that the results of the analysis produced by the FAMC
will diverge from those produced by the FAMP, because
the FAMP is able to rely on data collected by the FDMP,
which has access to the resource interface within the
CSP premises. In summary, the only independent foren-
sic data available to the CSC are based on proactively
collected provenance metadata. These metadata alone
cannot provide the CSC with sufficient information to
perform own forensic analysis and produce the same re-
sults that will be compatible with those produced by the
CSP. In such cases, FAMC and FAMP may produce di-
vergent unilaterally trusted outcomes.
Therefore, CSC and CSP should execute the Comparison
and Conflict Resolution Protocol (CCRP) by first negotiat-
ing to resolve the dispute. Here, the CCRP is a peer to peer
dispute resolution protocol in a sense that it will be exe-
cuted between the CSC and CSP without the intervention
of a third party. The model utilizes a non-repudiable object
sharing middleware for sharing the forensic data among
CSC and CSP to form the basis of CCRP [68, 71–73]. The
middleware can provide multi-party, non-repudiable agree-
ment to a shared forensic data with the CSC and CSP hold-
ing their own copies. Fundamentally, one party proposes
new forensic data pertaining to a cloud forensic case, and
the other party involved in that same case subjects the pro-
posed forensic data to a case-specific validation. Subse-
quently, when all parties involved in the case agree upon
the validity of the forensic data, the state of the shared
forensic data will accordingly be changed into mutually
trusted. For the non-repudiable agreement to a change of
state: (i) there must be evidence that any proposed forensic
data originated at its proposer, and (ii) there must be evi-
dence that all parties agreed to the proposed forensic data
and therefore share the same (agreed) view of the state of
the forensic data. In other words, there must be evidence
that the CSC and CSP involved in the case received the
proposed forensic data and that they agreed on the state
change (state is either mutually or unilaterally trusted).
Based on this case study, it is considered that the CSP
has collected forensic data, FDP, through the resource
interface of the StaaS, and that the CSC has proactively
collected forensic data FDC. Currently, the FDC and FDP
are unilaterally trusted by the CSC and CSP respectively.
Meanwhile, the problem is for the CSC and CSP to
reach an agreement on the forensic data that will ultim-
ately be used to investigate this particular cloud forensic
case. Hence, the basic consumer-provider agreement
process is that the CSP proposes FDP and the CSC per-
forms case specific validation by comparing the FDP
with FDC. Subsequently, the CSC returns a decision on
the validity, or otherwise, of the FDP. The middleware
utilizes a signed two-phase commit protocol (2PC), an
automatic commitment protocol, with application level
validation to accomplish the preceding basic agreement.
Figure 7 illustrates the execution of the protocol for
the CSP’s proposal of the FDP that has to be agreed with
the CSC. Initially, the CSP proposes FDP with evidence
of non-repudiation of its origin (NRO(FDP)). Subsequently,
the CSC validates FDP and returns a decision on its validity
or otherwise (decn), non-repudiation of receipt of FDP
(NRR(FDP)) and non-repudiation of origin of the decision
(NRO(decn)). The decision is a binary of either Yes or No
values. Consequently, the middleware annotates the deci-
sion with a case specific information. For instance, the deci-
sion may be annotated with the degree of divergence of the
proposed FDP from the CSC’s view of the forensic case. Fi-
nally, the protocol terminates with the CSP sending non-
repudiation of receipt of the CSC’s validation decision back
to the CSC (NRR(decn)).
If the CSC decides that the FDP is valid then the mu-
tually agreed set of forensic data that has to be used for
the forensic analysis is FDP. Otherwise, the failure to
Fig. 7 Non-repudiable sharing of forensic data
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agree to the proposed FDP will be signaled to both CSC
and CSP. As with annotations to decisions, this failure
signal can be used to initialize reasonable negotiations.
At the end of the protocol run, both CSC and CSP have
the same irrefutable view of the set of agreed FDP. Simi-
larly, both parties have an irrefutable validation decision
made with respect to proposed FDP that have been
rejected by either CSC or CSP.
If the negotiation fails to resolve the dispute, the two
parties will seek help from the LEA to correlate the unilat-
erally produced outcomes to normalize the dispute. In this
regards, the LEA uses the non-repudiated FDC and FDP.
Conclusion
As shown, consumers are increasingly relying on ready-
made resource services from cloud service providers. Some
sources of potential digital evidence are on the premises
that the provider unilaterally producing forensic data. In
cloud forensic there is a need for investigators to adapt and
develop a cloud forensic process model that would enable
forensic investigators to collect and analyze forensic data
on the consumer and provider sides. The live cloud forensic
process model presented in this article illustrates this issue
and provides a basis for the development of new tools in
cloud forensics.
Hence, with this process model, the authors believe
that the practice of provider-side data collection may
need to be supplemented by measures that enable cloud
consumers to produce their own forensic data, minim-
ally, to verify the reasonableness of the provider pro-
duced data. Bilaterally collection of digital evidence may
become a next logical step: the consumer and the pro-
vider independently collect and analyze the forensics
data, compare their outcomes and agree on a mutually
trusted outcome. We took a plausible cloud forensic
scenario, which employs a bilateral cloud forensic as a
service model to investigate an incident involved in a
storage as a service model, to highlight the issues in-
volved. The success of the bilateral cloud forensic as a
service (CFaaS) to a large extent will depend on two fac-
tors: the quality of forensic data consumers can collect
and the availability of a relatively simple comparison and
conflict resolution protocol (CCRP) to enable produc-
tion of mutually agreed outcomes. Service providers can
help consumers by providing: (i) a suitable service inter-
face to enable consumer side forensic analysis, and (ii) a
reference analysis tool to enable consumers to estimate
source of the security incident. Further, as we discussed,
sometimes there is also a need for a consumer (provider)
to collect forensic data directly at the provider’s (con-
sumer’s) premises, so suitable forensic analysis tech-
niques will need to be developed. CCRP procedures will
also need to be developed and agreed as a part of the
service level agreement.
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